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Unpredictability and Non-linearity in Complexity Theory:  
A Critical Appraisal 
 
Abstract: This piece explores potential problems with the focus on 
unpredictability and non-linearity within complexity theory.  Whilst not 
completely rejecting the application of ideas of non-linearity and 
unpredictability within the social sciences, I argue that greater 
empirical and conceptual care is needed.  The arguments made are 
illustrated by a critical examination of cases from John Urry’s Global 
Complexity, including the dominance of the petroleum-fuelled car in 
the 20th century and the prevalence of wild-fires in Malibu.  
Empirically speaking, I argue that claims about particular instances of 
non-linearity and unpredictability in the social world must be backed 
up by appropriate evidence, rather than analysts simply assuming 
that all social phenomena have these characteristics.  Conceptually 
speaking, I suggest that care needs to be taken to distinguish 
genuinely unpredictable phenomena from those that are simply 
poorly understood at the present time.  I also argue that predictability 
should be seen as a matter of degree. 
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1. Introduction 
It’s arguable that the emphasis in complexity theory on unpredictability and non-
linearity did not surprise social scientists, especially social theorists, but reinforced 
what they already believed.  The existence of non-linear and unpredictable 
phenomena may have come as a shock to those natural scientists who bought into a 
(roughly) Newtonian picture of a deterministic universe.1  But the vast majority of 
social theorists, and some empirical social scientists, already believed that the social 
world was not predictable and could not be understood by undertaking linear 
operations on quantitative information about social phenomena.  Defenders of 
interpretive social thought,(e.g. Winch, 1990 [1958]) social constructionists (e.g. 
Gergen, 1985), and even quasi-naturalists such as critical realists (e.g. Bhaskar, 1979), 
have argued against the possibility of scientific prediction in the social domain, and 
have preferred instead to focus on qualitative change and the richness of 
unquantifiable meaning.  This is not to say that complexity theory adds nothing to 
previous understandings of the social world, and at the very least complexity theory 
brings its own vocabulary and explanatory repertoire to account for the social world.  
Furthermore, complexity theory offers concepts that are held to apply to both the 
social and natural worlds, rather than arguing for a clear-cut division between the two 
in the manner of interpretive social thought.2   
 
Nevertheless, given the extent of common sympathies between complexity theory and 
its precursors, it may be that certain shared claims have not been as rigorously 
interrogated as they might otherwise have been.  If many are already convinced that 
                                                 
1 Presumably the shock was somewhat diminished for those who had already accepted indeterminism 
within the quantum domain. 
2 Critical realism could be argued to share complexity theory’s emphasis on continuity between the 
natural and social domains, although some hiatus between the two is often implied (see for example 
Archer, 1998). 
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the social world is an unpredictable place, and one in which social changes and 
developments rarely, if ever, have a ‘linear’ character, then claims by complexity 
theorists in these areas may have been given a relatively easy ride.  In this article I 
intend to build on the small amount of work of those who have questioned, to a 
greater or lesser extent, complexity theory’s treatment of prediction and linearity in 
the social world (see McLennan, 2003, 2006; Thompson, 2004).  My aim is not to 
attempt a demonstration that the social world is, contrary to complexity theory, fully 
predictable and linear in character.  Rather, my intention is to argue two things: 
firstly, that notions of unpredictability and non-linearity need to be used in a more 
careful and analytically precise way then they are in certain existing complexity 
arguments; and, secondly, that we need to carefully attend to the ways in which 
empirical cases actually do, or do not, fit in with ideas of unpredictability and non-
linearity as formulated in complexity theory.   
 
Given the limitations of space, I will focus only on the work of one prominent 
exponent of complexity theory in the social sciences, John Urry, and particularly on 
his Global Complexity (2003).  In Global Complexity, Urry strongly defends the 
relevance of complexity theory to the social sciences, and puts it to work in order to 
account for phenomena usually dealt with under the rubric of ‘globalization’, as well 
as applying it to numerous other examples.  Urry’s book offers a useful basis for 
discussion both because it makes these linkages between complexity theory and 
empirical examples, and because Urry draws heavily on ideas of non-linearity and 
unpredictability when analysing the social world.  In this article I shall consider his 
treatment of these concepts in turn, and offer some critical commentary on the extent 
to which they successfully account for the empirical examples that Urry presents. 
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2. Non-linearity, small causes and large effects 
Although ‘non-linear’ is a term used extensively by chaos and complexity theorists, 
there is some degree of dispute about its meaning.  Strictly speaking, ‘linear’ and 
‘non-linear’ are terms that are used to distinguish two types of mathematical equation; 
whereas linear equations can be solved by breaking them down into smaller pieces 
then recombining, this is not possible with non-linear equations (see McLennan, 
2006: 145; Kiel and Elliott, 1996: 4).  However, many less technically-minded 
discussions of chaos and complexity theory use the term to cover processes where 
there is something like a lack of proportionality between (changes to) the input and 
the outcome.  One oft-discussed type of case is that of ‘sensitivity to initial 
conditions’ in which the minutest difference in the starting conditions of particular 
kinds of system (such as those whose trajectories are governed by non-linear 
equations) may lead to large-scale differences in the state of that system when an 
extended period of time has elapsed.  The most famous instance of this is Lorenz’s 
discovery of the sensitivity of weather systems to initial conditions, often referred to 
as the ‘butterfly effect’ (Gleick, 1988).  Lorenz argued that the minutest alteration in 
the initial state of a weather system, such as the tiny amount of turbulence generated 
by a butterfly flapping its wings, can lead to a vastly different outcome – a storm 
occurring in a far-away city – than that which would have occurred if the butterfly 
had decided to have a rest – a sunny day in that city.   
 
In Global Complexity, Urry argues that the principle of non-linearity can be used to 
explain the emergence and persistence of certain technical forms such as the 
QWERTY keyboard and the petroleum-fuelled car (Urry, 2003: 54-5).  Urry does not 
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offer a rigorous definition of the term ‘non-linear’ (see McLennan, 2006)3, but 
appears to be drawing on the broad idea that for some phenomena there is a lack of 
proportionality between inputs and outputs.  In the realm of causal explanation this 
involves the claim that ‘there are often massive disproportionalities between causes 
and effects’ such that ‘Causation can indeed flow from contingent minor events to 
hugely powerful general processes’ (Urry, 2003: 7, 54).  Insofar as this is a coherent 
notion, it suggests that small, apparently accidental or insignificant causes can come 
to have a major influence on the development of a system. 
 
We will consider the example of the petroleum-fuelled car rather than the QWERTY 
keyboard here because its rise and persistence has had arguably more significant 
consequences.  As we know, petroleum came to be the power-source for the vast 
majority of cars in the 20th century.  Looking back at the history of this development, 
Urry suggests that in the 1890s petroleum was inferior to two other means of 
powering cars, electricity and steam.  In his article ‘The “System of Automobility”’, 
Urry discusses what happened next: 
 
‘Petroleum-fuelled cars were established for small-scale, more or less 
accidental reasons, partly because a petrol-fuelled vehicle was one of only two 
to complete a “horseless carriage competition” in Chicago in 1896.’ (Urry, 
2004: 32) 
 
                                                 
3 McLennan argues that the terms linear and non-linear are misused by Urry (and complexity theorists 
more generally) because their strict mathematical meanings are not adhered to (McLennan, 2006: 145).  
Whilst  I have some sympathy for this argument, the problem I am concerned with here is not the 
appropriation of the aura of the ‘hard’ sciences by social scientific complexity theories, so much as 
evidential and conceptual issues in the usage of ‘non-linear’ that actually has been adopted by social 
sciences, that relating to the proportionality of causes.  
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On this view, the petroleum-fuelled car became dominant not because of its technical 
superiority but through chance events.  This dominance was possible because small-
scale, contingent causes were magnified through processes of ‘lock-in’ in which ‘an 
astonishing array of other industries, activities and interests came to mobilize around 
the petroleum-based car’ (Urry, 2003: 55).  Once one path of development came to be 
backed by enough of the players within the industry and in supporting industries, it 
became extremely difficult to produce competitive alternatives because a whole 
network of institutions and businesses – such as petrol stations, petroleum producers, 
and car part manufacturers - came to have a vested interest in the persistence of a 
particular technological form rather than its opponents.  On Urry’s view, small scale 
chance events led to one power-source rather than others becoming dominant and also 
unchallengeable through non-linear processes of reinforcement present in institutional 
lock-in. 
 
I want to make two general kinds of argument about Urry’s analysis, one of which 
relates to the empirical basis for his claims, and the other of which is a more 
theoretical point.  Beginning from the empirical, I would argue that there are 
problems with Urry’s claim that the dominance of the petroleum-fuelled car is the 
result of ‘more or less accidental reasons’ (Urry, 2004: 32).  For one thing, Urry offers 
little or no evidence in support of this claim, offering only one reference to back up 
his historical account in ‘The “System of Automobility”’ (2004).  For another thing,  
if we look at relevant sources on the competition between different ways of powering 
cars (Motavalli (2000), Cowan and Hultén (1996) and Foreman-Peck, Bowden and 
McKinlay (1995)), the picture looks different to the one painted by Urry.  The most 
opposed interpretation to Urry’s is that put forward by Foreman-Peck et. al. (1995) 
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who argue that the petroleum car eventually won out in its contest with other power 
sources because it had the best match between its technical characteristics and those 
features that were desired by consumers.   As with Urry, Foreman-Peck et. al. refer to 
road races and endurance trials for cars, but present these as not minor shows or 
entertainments, but as important means by which technological advantages could be 
displayed (Foreman-Peck et al., 1995: 15).  Although they admit that steam-powered 
cars out-performed petrol cars on-and-off in contests of speed, they argue that the 
wider demand was not for the fastest cars but for those that were reliable and 
convenient, factors which endurance tests were a better proxy for (Foreman-Peck et 
al., 1995: 15-6).  Indeed Foreman-Peck et al. suggest that the superiority in reliability 
and convenience of petroleum cars was clearly apparent prior to their mass 
production, with some notable manufacturers abandoning steam for petrol before this 
point.  They thus challenge the view that the dominance of the petroleum-fuelled car 
was a product of the chance reinforcement of one power source rather than another 
through institutional lock-in.   
 
Other writers, such as Motavalli (2000), and Cowan and Hultén (1996), do not 
challenge the ‘lock-in’ thesis as a partial means to explain the dominance of 
petroleum-powered cars over steam- and, particularly, electric-powered cars during 
the 20th century.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that they attribute the dominance 
of petroleum-powered vehicles to chance, accidental events.  For one thing, these 
writers are clear that there were only three plausible sources of power for cars at the 
end of the 19th and beginning of  the 20th century – steam, electricity and petroleum.  
Even were it to be established that petroleum had no intrinsic merits over the others, 
its status as a serious contender at the time does not seem to be challenged.  Thus we 
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already have a narrowing of the field of possibility that was not the result of chance or 
accident per se.  Further than this, both Cowan and Hultén and Motavalli 
acknowledge that at the time the mass-production of cars was undertaken, petroleum-
based cars had clear advantages over their competitors.  In their analysis, Cowan and 
Hultén list the problems faced by cars using each of the three power sources at around 
the turn of the century, and point out that for the petroleum-powered car, all of them 
had been solved by 1912, except their noisiness.  By contrast, both the steam car and 
electric car seemed to have serious remaining problems – the steam car’s consumption 
of ‘immense amounts of water’ and the electric car’s limited range and low top speed 
(Cowan and Hultén, 1996: 68).  Motavalli, who is extremely sympathetic to 
alternative, non-petroleum-based ways of powering cars, also acknowledges the 
limitations of alternative forms of power at the time the petroleum-powered cars were 
being mass-produced (Motavalli, 2000: 9).   
 
Summarising these points, I would suggest that the empirical analyses considered here 
throw Urry’s analysis into question.  Even if we only accept what is agreed by all of 
these writers, it does not make sense to say that the dominance of petroleum-fuelled 
motor cars is due to minor, accidental, factors.  Petroleum was one of only three 
plausible means to power cars at the end of the 19th century, and the major problems 
with petroleum-powered cars were resolved before those of steam- and electricity- 
powered cars.  As such, Urry’s claim that this is an example of a non-linear complex 
phenomenon, in which accidental causes lead to hugely significant outcomes, is 
thrown into question.  
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My second overall point about Urry’s use of this example is that even if he were to 
challenge other accounts and provide the empirical evidence to establish that the 
dominance of the petroleum car was the result of small-scale, accidental causes, there 
would need to be a degree of refinement in how such a case is talked about.  Both 
Urry and other commentators refer to the idea that in some cases a small cause has 
large effects (e.g. Urry, 2005: 6; Hayles, 1991: 11).  However, this is problematic 
because it misdirects attention by focusing only on one of the causes that leads to the 
final outcome in any given case.  To see this, let us start with the classic ‘chaos 
theory’ example of a putatively small cause that has large effects, the butterfly effect.  
As we saw above, this involves the claim that the tiny amount of turbulence generated 
by a butterfly flapping its wings can lead to a vastly different outcome, say a storm 
occurring in a far-away city instead of the sunny weather that would have occurred if 
the butterfly had decided to have a rest.  Is the butterfly’s wing-flapping a small cause 
that generates a large effect?  I would argue that this is not the case.  After all, the 
small cause of the butterfly’s wing-flapping does not cause, all by itself, the large 
effect of a storm occurring.  Rather, the butterfly’s wing-flapping is one of a range of 
atmospheric causal influences that interact and ramify over time, resulting in a storm.  
It is thus more accurate to say that two systems whose end-states are the results of 
many causes, may end up in markedly different end-states even if their starting 
conditions differ only by one small causal influence.4  This is not merely a pedantic 
                                                 
4 Perhaps some of the confusion here arises from cases where there is just one iterating cause, where 
the state of a system depends on just one cause repeated over time.  A simple system of this kind would 
be one in which the key variable capturing the system state was X, and where for every time interval 
that elapsed a cause operated such that the value of X was squared.  The equation for such a case would 
be X(T+1)=X(T)2.  This equation means that the value of X at some particular time (Time ‘T+1’) is the 
square of the value of X at the time interval before (Time ‘T’).  As Harvey and Reed point out, in 
situations of this kind, slight initial differences in the value of X will lead down the line to much larger 
differences because of the repeated squaring of the value (Harvey and Reed, 1994: 379).  It is correct to 
say that it might only take a very small causal input to alter the initial state of the system, captured in 
the initial value of ‘X’.  It is also correct to say that there will be a marked difference in how the system 
develops over time even if this initial value was altered only minutely, for example the difference 
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point, in my view, because it emphasizes the importance of attending to the various 
other causes that contribute to any outcome.  If one believes that small causes have 
large effects, one does not need to seriously consider the other causes that contributed 
to these effects.   
 
To be fair to Urry, his discussion of the domination of the petroleum-car does point 
towards the kinds of processes which reinforce the early advantages that the 
petroleum car might have had, insofar as there are learning processes in both 
constructing and using petroleum cars and their support systems which make it less 
effective for organizations to shift to other modes once they ‘back’ the petroleum car 
(Urry, 2003: 55).  However, stronger emphasis needs to be given to these processes in 
my view, and further examination.  Even if the complexity-based explanation was 
correct, Urry would need to accept that the dominance of the petrol car, as an ‘effect’, 
would not be anything like sufficiently explained by reference to the ‘cause’ of it 
completing a race in Chicago in 1896.  Rather, it would be explained by a variety of 
causal factors including initial causes, but also including the institutional processes 
that created and supported the large-scale dominance of the petrol car against 
competitors, as well as those social and natural features that allowed the petrol car to 
continue to be viable (the existence of vast reserves of oil in the world, for example).  
These other causal features may well turn out to be somewhat distinctive, or at least 
only one class of phenomena amongst others, insofar as not all technological fields 
are dominated by one form of technology.5  As such, I would suggest that we should 
                                                                                                                                            
between Xinitial=2 and Xinitial=2.0001.  However, this does not mean that the small cause altering the 
start value of X has had a large effect.  Rather, the difference between the system that results depending 
on the two different values of Xinitial  is the result of the combination of the small cause altering Xinitial, 
and the many instances of the cause that produces a squaring of the value of X. 
5There do seem to be technological fields where there are multiple viable competitors at any one time.  
One example from the past few years is that of music in which CDs, vinyl records, tapes and MP3-files 
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dispose of the summary claim that a small cause can have large effects, and offer 
more precise formulations that encourage attention to be given to all of the relevant 
causal influences at work.6 
 
3. Unpredictability  
The other aspect of complexity discourse that I would like to examine here is the 
argument that complex phenomena are intrinsically unpredictable in character.  
Complexity discourse shares an emphasis on unpredictability with chaos theory, 
although arguably not to the same extent.  Chaos theorists often argue that the 
trajectories of chaotic systems are inherently unpredictable in the sense that it is not 
possible to precisely predict where the system will be in state-space at any particular 
point in time.7  Complex orders are frequently held to have a degree of stability, but to 
be periodically subject to unpredictable developments in which self-organising 
processes will reformulate the system and its structure (Harvey and Reed, 1994).  
Thus, key writers such as Prigogine have tended to place an emphasis on the ultimate 
unpredictability of complex systems, their tendency to bifurcate such that they 
develop in one of two possible directions, and the impossibility of predicting which 
                                                                                                                                            
co-exist as formats.  This is not to say that all of these forms will persist, but that they have 
meaningfully persisted for a certain period of time along with one another.  Contrasts between this kind 
of case and the apparently almost utter dominance of the petroleum car need to be examined.  Of 
course, a further issue is where one draws the line with competitors; if aeroplanes, trains and boats are 
considered competitors then the petroleum car is not utterly dominant. 
6 It is worth briefly noting that the causal processes involved in the ‘butterfly effect’ and ‘lock-in’ are 
somewhat different.  In the case of the butterfly effect, the difference in outcomes is based on the vast 
number of causal interactions that take place in order to generate the weather.  Weather systems with 
slightly different initial conditions may develop in quite strongly divergent ways.  However, this 
divergence is not predictable given our current capacities of measurement and calculation.  As such, it 
is not possible to predictably generate bad weather at some part of the globe by slightly altering the 
conditions at another point.  In the case of ‘lock in’, the divergence of outcomes is based on the way in 
which one development path or another is reinforced over time by surrounding developments.  Insofar 
as the lock-in theory is correct, it should be possible to manipulate initial conditions in order to 
predictably generate the preferred path of development.   
7 For an argument about the limitations of unpredictability in chaotic systems see Brown (1996). 
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direction will be taken (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 160-170).8  Proponents of 
complexity theory in the social science have been particularly enthusiastic to embrace 
this emphasis on unpredictability chiming in as it does with social theoretical 
concerns after positivism which have variously emphasised the role of agency, 
contingency and unintended consequences in social life (see for example Giddens, 
1984: Bhaskar, 1979).   
 
Urry is certainly keen to find unpredictable phenomena in the social world (see for 
example Urry, 2003: 59-72, 95, 105), and here I want to consider how analytically 
robust two of Urry’s examples are.  The first example makes a link between the non-
linear character of a phenomenon and its unpredictability, dealing with the ecological 
relationships between settlers and the environment in Malibu, United States.  This is a 
case that Urry draws from Mike Davis’ fascinating book  Ecology of Fear: Los 
Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (2000).  Urry presents the example as 
follows (Urry, 2003: 34-5).  Malibu can be considered the ‘wildfire capital of North 
America’ in that it suffers incredibly intense fires with relative frequency.  The most 
significant factor in causing this is ‘non-linear relationship between the age structure 
of vegetation and the intensity of fires that are generated’ (Urry, 2003: 34).  For 
example, 50 year old vegetation of the kind present in Malibu does not burn 2 ½ times 
as intensely as 20 year old vegetation, but 50 times as intensely.  Instead of being 
burnt off when it is young, however, the vegetation is often given the chance to age 
significantly because of the policy of ‘total fire suppression’.  The result of this is that 
when blazes do get started they are extreme in character, frequently burning down 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that other complexity theorists, while acknowledging the lack of strict predictability 
of complex systems, argue that there are attractors in the state-space of complex systems which draw 
them towards a limited set of possible configurations (see for example Kauffman, 1993). 
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numerous properties as well as putting the lives of residents, fire-fighters and others in 
the locale at risk.  Summing up his discussion, Urry states: 
 
‘This example shows that certain kinds of cause can generate huge and 
unpredictable change while other examples would show that external causes 
could generate almost no significant effects.’ (Urry, 2003: 35) 
 
In response to Urry’s analysis, I want to suggest that it is seriously unhelpful to 
describe the presence of intense forest fires in Malibu as unpredictable.  Certainly, an 
emphasis on their unpredictability is quite out of the spirit of Davis’s analysis (see Ch. 
3 of Davis, 2000).  For one thing, Davis presents the move to ‘develop’ Malibu in the 
20th century as misguided from the start, because of the: 
  
‘…uncanny alignment of its coastal canyons with the annual “fire winds” from 
the north: the notorious Santa Anas… The San Fernando Valley acts as a giant 
bellows, sometimes fanning the Santa Anas to hurricane velocity as they roar 
seaward…Add a spark to the dense, dry vegetation on such an occasion and 
the hillsides will explode into uncontrollable wildfire.’ (Davis, 2000: 100) 
 
Davis’ argument is that the combination of geography and climate of the region 
makes it predictable that there will be fires, particularly at certain times of year.   
 
As Urry reports, Davis further argues that the combination of a ‘total fire suppression’ 
policy and the non-linear increase in burning intensity leads to particularly severe 
fires in the Malibu area.  However, unlike Urry, Davis makes no connection between 
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non-linearity and unpredictability.  Rather, Davis’ analysis is based on the fact that 
knowledge of the non-linear increase in burning intensity actually makes outcomes 
predictable in some sense.  In other words, given the non-linearity in question, it is 
precisely predictable that a policy of total fire suppression will lead to hugely intense 
fires.9  Furthermore, these intense fires could be largely avoided if there were 
controlled burn-offs every few years, as these would prevents the vegetation getting to 
an age where it predictably burns with high intensity (Davis, 2000: 144).10  Another 
predictable outcome that can be generated from Davis’ analysis is that comparable 
environments, such as parts of Baja California, will fare differently to Malibu because 
of their differing policies on fires.  In the uplands of Baja California, where there is no 
attempt at fire suppression, there are more fires but they are ‘patchier’ and less 
intense, because high intensity vegetation does not build up (Davis, 2000: 103).  The 
overall point I want to make here is that Urry misdescribes this kind of example 
because of his belief that non-linearity is intrinsically linked to unpredictability.  The 
intensity of Malibu wildfires is not unpredictable given the relevant knowledge. 
 
It is important to clarify that in claiming certain aspects of Malibu wildfires to be 
predictable, I am not suggesting that we can be absolutely certain about the timing 
and placement of their occurrence and their precise characteristics (exact temperature 
and so on).  However, if this level of detail and precision is necessary to be able to 
deem some phenomenon to be predictable then this would exclude many if not all 
social scientific cases, as well as many natural scientific ones.  Indeed, absolute 
                                                 
9 Of course, those who set up the total fire suppression policy may not have known about the non-linear 
relationship between vegetation age and burning intensity.  But this limitation to their knowledge does 
not make the situation unpredictable in principle, just unpredicted at that point in time.  
10 Davis does note that the small possibility of break-away fires would expose the fire departments to 
potential lawsuits (Davis, 2000: 144).  However, if there was a general policy of controlled burn-offs, 
the material would not be there for fires of high intensity. 
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certainty of this kind is not even present in natural scientific laboratory controlled 
situations, given that scientists can never be certain that they know all of the possible 
confounding conditions including local contingent ones (See for example Collins, 
1985).11  Rather than placing all social scientific phenomena in the ‘unpredictable’ 
category, I would suggest that there are some cases in which we can have confidence 
that, under specified conditions, certain outcomes are likely to occur within a given 
time and space range.  We can thus distinguish relatively predictable events, such as 
the intense character of Malibu wildfires, from completely unpredictable events, such 
as the numbers in the next lottery draw, rather than putting these together in the same 
category - ‘not predictable with certainty’. 
 
The other putative example of unpredictability that I would like to consider here 
arises from Urry’s discussion of networks and fluids that are global in character.  Urry 
introduces his analysis of networks and fluids as part of his exploration of new ways 
to analyse global spaces.  Urry’s intention is to analyse the emergent properties of the 
global order without placing old-fashioned and outmoded concepts like ‘nation’ and 
‘region’ at the centre of the analysis (Urry, 2003: 42-6).  According to Urry, globally 
integrated networks are not nationally bounded, but operate transnationally ‘across 
multiple and distant spaces and times’ (Urry, 2003: 57).  These networks make fairly 
stable and predictable links between people and objects around the globe, and are 
employed by organizations like Microsoft, McDonalds and Greenpeace to allow 
efficient communications, successful delivery of products and profits, and so on.   
 
                                                 
11 One does not have to agree with every aspect of Collins’ analysis to accept his point that local 
contingencies of experimental set-up can have an impact upon any particular attempt to run an 
experiment. 
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Global fluids are, according to Urry, less stable than globally integrated networks, and 
interact with other fluids, networks and organizations in unpredictable ways.  These 
fluids include travelling peoples, global brands, social movements, the world’s 
oceans, environmental and health hazards and automobility (Urry, 2003: 59-74).  Urry 
argues that fluids are the result of many local actions which can interact and ramify to 
create ‘global waves’.  Urry states: 
 
‘The “particles” of people, information, objects, money, images, risks and 
networks move within and across diverse regions forming heterogeneous, 
uneven, unpredictable and often unplanned waves…Such waves demonstrate 
no clear point of departure, deterritorialized movement, at certain speeds and 
at different levels of viscosity with no necessary end state or purpose’ (Urry, 
2003: 60) 
 
Thus global fluids are seen by Urry as unpredictable, and as often lacking a clear start 
and end point. 
 
Urry is aware that earlier writers within the sociological tradition, such as Durkheim, 
have argued against modes of representation that attempt to capture the ‘flux’ of life 
without abstracting from this to arrive at more stable, fixed conceptualizations (Urry, 
2003: 59).  However, Urry defends his approach in a broadly realist fashion by 
arguing that concepts of flow, liquidity, waves and so on are necessary to accurately 
describe what global society is like.  The defence of these concepts is, for Urry, 
simply a matter of representational adequacy. 
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Whilst I would accept that, in principle, fluids, flows and unpredictable waves may 
exist, it is important to remember that identification of phenomena as having these 
characteristics is potentially fallible.  Furthermore, as John Holmwood has argued, 
accounts of particular phenomena that emphasize their indeterminacy – 
unpredictability, unevenness, no clear point of departure, no necessary end state or 
purpose – have similar characteristics to confused accounts of determinate phenomena 
(Holmwood, 1996; see also Thompson 2004).  Putting this another way, a process that 
appears to be erratic and unpredictable in its operation may actually be a relatively 
determinate process that is currently being misunderstood.  The relevance of 
Holmwood’s contention to the present case is backed up, in my view, by the lack of 
analytical rigour present in Urry’s discussions of some examples of global fluids.  By 
categorising all ‘travelling peoples’ as one fluid, for example, it is hardly surprising 
that this fluid seems unpredictable, heterogeneous and so on.  However, a more 
careful separation of some of the constituents of that fluid might allow a more 
coherent picture to emerge, insofar as, for example, the ‘flows’ of refugees and 
transnational capitalists are likely to have different characteristics and logics (see 
McLennan, 2003: 555).   In another of his examples, that of automobility (the car 
system), Urry himself undermines the notion that he is analysing an unpredictable 
fluid with no clear starting point.  For one thing, Urry clearly attributes the beginnings 
of the system of automobility to North America, implying that there is a 
straightforward, identifiable point of departure of this transport wave.  For another 
thing, Urry goes on to suggest that societies become ‘locked in’ to the system of 
automobility in a way that seems ‘impossible to break from’ (Urry, 2003: 69).  These 
phrases are hardly redolent with notions of unpredictability and fluidity.  As such, 
some of Urry’s claims about the unpredictability of ‘global fluids’ seem rather  
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overstated.  Furthermore, in some cases it may be that it is analytical and conceptual 
problems which gives social phenomena the appearance of indeterminacy, rather than 
this being inherent in the phenomena themselves. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this piece has been to critically reflect on the concepts of non-linearity 
and unpredictability, concepts which are commonly invoked by complexity theorists.  
The aim has been not to debunk complexity theory, or the work of John Urry which I 
have focused upon, but to use Urry’s stimulating discussion of global complexity as a 
basis for thinking about how complexity theory might become more analytically 
precise in its use of notions like non-linearity and unpredictability.  This has involved 
both challenging the standard formulation that ‘small causes have large effects’ and 
arguing that there is a range of levels of predictability, rather than a simple contrast 
between completely predictable and totally unpredictable.  As well as this, I have 
been raising the question of the empirical justification of claims about non-linearity 
and unpredictability as constitutive features of the social and natural worlds.  Two 
dimensions are important here.  The more narrowly empirical issue is that claims 
about the non-linearity and/or unpredictability of certain phenomena, such as the 
dominance of the petrol engine or the spread of wildfires in Malibu, need to be 
carefully justified by empirical evidence, rather than being accepted too swiftly by 
those enthusiastic to find complexity everywhere in the social and natural worlds.  
The wider conceptual component of the argument is that the apparent indeterminacy 
and  unpredictability of phenomena may be signs of the limitations of existing 
concepts and theories rather than indicators of the true nature of the phenomena in 
question.  I say may be signs here because it cannot be demonstrated that all 
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phenomena can be rendered determinate and predictable, and complexity theorists 
have made interesting arguments which account for why certain phenomena may not 
have this character (see for example Cilliers, 1998).  However, there is a danger in 
always operating with an assumption that the social world and its constituents must be 
intrinsically fluid and unpredictable.  Those who are convinced that the social world 
has this form may fail to examine whether the apparently intrinsically confusing and 
unpredictable nature of the phenomena they study is actually an artefact of their own 
limited categories.  For these reasons, a careful analytical and empirical approach to 
issues of non-linearity and unpredictability is essential.  
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